

Murat Gül

THE 'GERMAN QUESTION'
A DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION

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Introduction

The reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar international structure have created uncertainties in the international system. After reunification economically giant Germany started to pursue a more independent foreign policy discourse which destructed the image of 'political pigmy' that lived under the security umbrella of the western alliance. The former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in the very first years of the reunification, underlined the re-emergence of Germany as an equal and effective member of the international community. The 1990s have been a transformation period for the international community within which the core principles have become continuity, community and limitation. However, the physical and psychological effects of the reunification, on German people and administrations, and their practical implications on German foreign policy, have been an issue of special attention.

The central geographical orientation of Germany in Europe, has vested new responsibilities to the country, for the future development of the continent. Moreover, Germany as the most powerful state in the middle of Europe has started to play a crucial role (with other big powers of the world) in the execution and reconstruction of international politics. The construction of the 'United States of Europe' within which Germany 'should' play the leading role and realize 'Europeanization of Germany' have been supported by the German foreign policy-makers. In addition to this intra-integration in Western Europe, integration of Eastern and Western Europe has been a primary foreign policy objective for the German administrations. With this objective, responsibility and her huge economic and political capabilities, Germany has been considered as one of the 'engines' of European integration, probably the most important one.

Both German people and German administrations regained self-reliance after the reunification. Today, Germans are (and feel themselves as) the citizens of a democratic and modern state, like the other peoples of the western countries. The new generation of Germans has gained a mentality of European integration and tries to cut its ties with the crimes of the World War II. Thus, the formulation of a European foreign and security policy and the extension of this integration concept to Eastern Europe are crucial for Ger-

many. Germany wants to play the leading role in the determination of the principles of common foreign and security policy, and has the capability to do so. Such an assertiveness has put Germany under the spotlights and Germany's roles, responsibilities and foreign policy practices have begun to be discussed by the International Relations academic community.

Several questions have been asked since the reunification of the country: Will Germany still be a 'civilian power' or will it become militarized? Will Germany keep its objectives of European integration and the extension of 'European values' to Eastern Europe or will it shift from this multilateral context and pursue a 'go it alone' policy? Will Germany still rely on Atlantic alliance for its self-defence or will it go nuclear and develop its own security agenda? In sum, the key question to be asked is: 'Will Europe and the wider international community face a new "German Question" or has this question been resolved in a peaceful and democratic way?'

1. *The German Question in the Pre-Unification Period*

Germany's position between 1945 and 1949 was, to a certain extent, also the inexorable consequence of its geographical situation in the center of Europe – torn between the West and the East. The West, represented by Britain and France, had been industrializing since the Industrial Revolution in Britain and democratizing since the political revolution in France. On the other side, autocratic Tsarist Russia had represented the East. However, although the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 had dramatically changed the ideological colors of the East from autocratic Tsarism on the right to totalitarian Soviet communism on the extreme left, the Revolution had not changed the basic dilemma (for Germany) because Germany wedged in between the liberal West and the left-wing totalitarian East, with the strongest communist party outside Soviet Russia. The world structural divide in 1945, and division in Europe, was now between 'the Free West' led by the US and 'the Communist East' led by the USSR.

Actually, after 18 January 1871, by uniting into one national state under Otto von Bismarck, Germany had become too strong for any balance of power within the European system, which had been defined since Utrecht 1713. The late unification of Germany as a 'nation state' was the beginning of the – so called – 'German Question' to become a continuous problem in the international forums. There are three main reasons behind the emergence of a 'German Question': the first is the German unification in terms of Germany's territorial and national unity; the second is Germany's unification in terms of Constitutional unity; and the third is a problem of international status, Germany's unification within the framework of the treaties conducted to provide the stability of the European states system.¹ The 'German Question' is defined by Timothy G. Ash as the fears of Germany's neighbours to keep such a dynamic, over-populated and geographically central-oriented country with its huge economic capabilities, under control and not to let it again destabilize the political order on the continent.²

After the surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945, the future of Germany was the most important of all European questions. Anglo-Soviet interests

¹ Bağcı, Hüseyin, *Almanya: Yeni Bir Dünya Gücü?*, Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1992, pp. 2-3.

² Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p. 23.

during World War II had been defined as the need to contain Germany and to devise the best means of preventing the revival of a strong and aggressive Germany. However, the note sent by the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee on 10 April 1946 was stating that: ‘The Russians have decided upon an aggressive policy based upon militant communism and Russian chauvinism’. This statement had a great impact on the British government’s policy in the sense that, up to that time the British had thought of the German problem solely in terms of Germany itself and had aimed to prevent the revival of ‘the German war machine’. However, Bevin was writing in a top secret Cabinet paper on 3 May 1946 that ‘The worst situation of all would be a revived Germany in league with or dominated by Russia’.³ Since then Germany was still a country to be kept under control but not left to Russian domination. From January 1947 an economic unit, with the name of ‘*Bizonia*’, was created. However, its creation was more than just the economic fusion of the British and American (occupied) zones. *Bizonia* was a turning point in post-war Germany: it marked the end of four-power (US, USSR, Britain and France) cooperation and the beginning of Anglo-American collaboration in Germany. Thus, *Bizonia* was the beginning of the end of German unity. Even before the founding of the Federal Republic, basic decisions had set the course for West Germany: the fusion of the three western occupation zones (of the US, Britain and France) in 1947 and 1948 foreshadowed the future Federal Republic. A Six-Power Conference (by the US, Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg – the last three so-called Benelux countries) was held in London between February and June 1948 and the formal decision was to set up a West German State.⁴

The Konrad Adenauer Era

The first federal elections of West Germany, held on 14 August 1949, enabled Konrad Adenauer’s Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) to form a coalition with the Free Democrats (FDP) and the Deutsche Partei (DP). Since then, the 73-years old new West German Chancellor became the key personality for the reconciliation process between the West and West Germany.

³ Steininger, Rolf, “The German Question, 1945-95”, in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12.

Thus, analyzing the Adenauer era and his political role is crucial for understanding West German politics after 1945, because he left his stamp on the foreign policy of the Federal Republic. Adenauer was so determined that the future of West Germany lay in integration with the West and the incorporation of West Germany into the Western institutional structures, through completely breaking the legacy of the *Third Reich*. Adenauer and his supporters, within the CDU/CSU, sought a European political order that would irrevocably tie the West German state and society to the political and cultural system (and values) of Western Europe. This was to be achieved by making West Germany an equal and respected partner of the Western powers and by forging a fundamental reconciliation between West Germany and France. The strategy and policies of Adenauer emanated from the perception of a credible threat from the USSR. Adenauer's solution for the communist challenge was the creation of a 'united Western Europe'. In addition to this, there were other reasons for Adenauer's strong insistence on West European integration: The emotional controversy about how to define Germany's national identity and which priorities were to triumph – European or German unification – was continuing. Adenauer's policy was to join the West, making the West and West Germany so strong that one day the Soviet Union would give way and grant German reunification in its own interest. Thus, it can be argued that Adenauer assessed reunification as a further step that would come after West Germany consolidated its power, and reunification could be imposed on the East, while the latter was weakening. Some scholars formulate this policy that 'Adenauer found the connection between the concepts of Western integration and German reunification in the belief that a consolidation in the West would automatically lead to the collapse of the Soviet dominance in the Eastern zone, what was termed as the "magnetic concept"'.⁵

Adenauer's 'west-oriented' foreign policy was called as *Westpolitik* and its main goals were defined as cooperation with the West and making West Germany a member of Western organizations; restore confidence for the country through making West Germany a reliable partner; give priority for improving relations with France and realize European integration through which West Germany could achieve its foreign, security and economic policy goals. Actually, the main facets of *Westpolitik* can be summarized by two

⁵ Pfetsch, P. Frank, *West Germany: Internal Structures and External Relations*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988, p. 184.

concepts: the supranationalization and westernization of West Germany's foreign policy.

Supranationalization implied a basic abandonment of the (extreme) nationalist thinking of the former German foreign policy course. The new West German state became a leading champion of the schemes for Atlantic and European integration processes. The interplay of national and supranational perspectives became a central theme in West Germany's post-World War II foreign policy culture.

Westernization aimed at basic reconciliation of the historical (political) alienation between the West and West Germany. The pro-western civilization tendency (*Abendland*) that was stressing the political, philosophical and ideological values that West Germany was sharing with its western allies, was shaped by the CDU/CSU administration, under Adenauer's leadership.

In accordance with the above-mentioned facets, Adenauer's foreign policy-making, mainly, rested on three components that aimed to restore both political and economic sovereignty for West Germany: First of all, after recognizing the strong reputation and continuing mistrust for West Germany abroad, Bonn acted in a way through which it would achieve its foreign policy goals within a multilateral framework. One and the first aspect of this multilateral framework was that the civilian representatives of Washington, Paris and London (in West Germany) did the final work on West Germany's external relations and on certain domestic questions (such as armament). Since the very beginning of his term in office, Adenauer had to (and preferred to) walk on a line of cooperation with his three western allies, for the defence of West German interests. The second component of his foreign policy was that through entering into multilateral commitments of ECSC and EEC, Adenauer was willing to confront the legacy of the pre-World War II German policy implications and to implement confidence-building measures (for West Germany), in order to counter the effects of history. Finally, a major component of Adenauer's western strategy of recognition and reconciliation was his emphasis on what was called in the 1950s, 'the memory of the hopeful but abortive rapprochement between Paris and Berlin in the 1920s'.⁶

⁶ Geiss, Imanuel, "The Federal Republic of Germany in International Politics Before and After Unification", in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, pp. 140-142.

The motives that fostered Germany's initial orientation of European integration can be, easily, found in Adenauer's own words: "It was important to establish close ties with those peoples that 'by their nature' held concurrent views on government, human rights, freedom and property".⁷ By this Adenauer expressed that he held European culture and values as the basis of European integration. Adenauer perceived Russia as an imminent threat toward the West, and he used this perception to justify his policy of European integration in the minds of West Germans. In accordance with this line of thinking, Adenauer continuously tried to improve relations with Western states, primarily with France. According to him, hostility between Germany and France would be like a "decaying body in the middle of Europe" – as Churchill had put it – and would be "just as detrimental for Europe as a victorious Nazi Germany."⁸

Soviet attempts to prevent rapprochement between the West and West Germany and prevent possible West German membership in NATO, could not alter Adenauer's pro-Western policy orientation and objectives. With his famous note of 10 March 1952, Stalin tried to torpedo the integration of West Germany into Western Europe, and prevent West German rearmament. Stalin offered a united Germany, including a small national army for its self-defence, with the only precondition that the unified Germany should not become a member of any kind of military alliance that involved the USA. On 16 March Chancellor Adenauer responded and said that there was nothing new in Stalin's offer and it was intended to isolate West Germany through neutralizing the country and preventing its integration with the West.⁹

All steps made in the field of foreign policy basically also affected the status of West Germany and Germany as a whole. The first bone of contention was how best to regain sovereignty and, as mentioned above, Adenauer sought it by an arrangement with the Western powers. The Korean War at the end of June 1950 raised the spectre of a communist military advance in Europe. Pressures from America to provide some contribution to the defence of Western Europe and Adenauer's offer to supply a West German

⁷ Pfetsch, P. Frank, *West Germany: Internal Structures and External Relations*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988, p. 181.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁹ Steininger, Rolf, "The German Question, 1945-95", in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p. 12.

military contingent, sparked off bitter controversies about the rearmament of West Germany. Adenauer wanted to use West German divisions as a lever to regain sovereignty for West Germany.

The basic problem was finding some way to appease French and British apprehensions about the potential threat to their security from a powerful West German military existence. The result was the European Defence Community (EDC), into which West German troops were to be integrated from the level of divisions. However, the EDC foundered in the French National Assembly in August 1954. Despite the bitter resistance from the West German opposition parties, West Germany's 'military contribution' was made in the form of the Federal Republic becoming an ally of the Western powers, who now left their troops stationed in West Germany, to protect West Germany and Western Europe against the threat of a Soviet attack. The three Western powers (the US, Britain and France) reserved for themselves only the final decisions over the status of West Berlin and of German unification as a whole.

The membership of West Germany was termed as 'quasi-sovereignty' or 'near-sovereignty' (which continued up until the reunification of Germany in 1990), which implied that the rearmament of the West German state had been accepted, but this would be in a limited scale and would be done within a multilateral context (NATO). The consequences of quasi-sovereignty were far-reaching: since the Federal Republic claimed to be the only truly legitimate German state, it tried to isolate the communist East Germany by the Hallstein Doctrine (the Doctrine which was first implemented by the Adenauer Administration up until the Chancellorship of Willy Brandt in 1969). According to this doctrine, all states that recognised the GDR would be punished by breaking off diplomatic relations by the Federal Republic. Adenauer administration had to make an exception with Russia, because Moscow held the key to any possible German unification. Thus, Bonn resumed diplomatic relations with Moscow and achieved the release of the last 10.000 German prisoners of war (in the USSR), who had been held back as 'war criminals' (since World War II), during Adenauer's visit to Moscow in September 1955. As mentioned above, Chancellor Adenauer's 9 September 1955 visit to Moscow was the first and implied the opening of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the USSR. On 10 September 1980, Christian Democrat expert on foreign policy, Alois Mertes projected this

visit as the point where ‘German *Ostpolitik* began’.¹⁰ The discussion over nuclear weapons was another aspect of the issue. The Bundestag adopted a resolution which demanded ‘equality’ for the Federal Republic in the domain of nuclear weapons. However, in fact, nothing ever came of it, certainly because West Germany’s Western allies, including the US, were just as wary of nuclear weapons in German hands, as was the Soviet Union. In addition to this external opposition, the highly emotional movement of 1958 against atomic weapons for West Germany, organized by the SPD (Social Democratic Party), trade unions and pacifist groups, was an important part of the discussion. Another far-reaching consequence of the quasi-sovereignty was that the GDR achieved a comparable status within the communist Eastern Bloc: it became a member of the Warsaw Pact in January 1955. In spite of its internal weaknesses, the GDR rose to become the second strongest political, economic and military factor within the Soviet Bloc.

After the Schuman Plan for a measure of coordination between the French and German coal and steel industries in 1950 and the foundation of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, the principle of controlling West German economic power through European integration was institutionalized and widened by the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The EEC broadened the original Franco-German arrangement to include Italy and the Benelux countries. Economic gains for West Germany from the European Common Market were great and contributed to the ‘German economic miracle’ that was going on.

Actually, Adenauer’s rejection of Stalin’s note of 10 March 1952, the uprising of 17 June 1953 in East Berlin and East Germany (East Germans demanding more freedom, improvement in humane conditions and economic situation), which was the first of comparable turmoil shattering the USSR, had destroyed all chances for early German unification. The next crisis, over Berlin, came out in 1958. Refugees from the GDR had kept slipping over to West Berlin through the borders of East Berlin. Khrushchev’s Berlin Ultimatum of 1958 to West Germany (to stop the influx of refugees) could not solve the problem. When the number of refugees to West Germany rose to unprecedented heights, the East German Communist Party Leader Walter Ulbricht wanted to eliminate West Berlin by a military coup, but was deflected from this attempt by the compromise solution of Khrushchev: seal-

¹⁰ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe’s Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p. 35.

ing off the intra-Berlin boundaries between West and East Berlin. This brought about the building of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961.

The year of 1963 marked a milestone in West German-French relations. Chancellor Adenauer made a move with the Elysée Treaty of 1963, with which he hoped to forge unbreakable links between West Germany and France. It was important within the European context and the logic of Franco-West German relations since 1950, because both countries had become the nucleus for any meaningful integration of Europe. However, French President de Gaulle had drifted into his own peculiar brand of nationalism: he had vetoed Britain's entrance into the EEC in 1963 and 1967, pulled out of NATO in 1966, cultivated his own nuclear force and followed a course of almost headlong collision with the US. The Elysée Treaty thus provoked a controversy between the 'Atlanticists' and the 'Gaullists'. The West German policy-makers had to find an uneasy balance between the superpower over the Atlantic and their closest and greatest immediate neighbour on the continent. Thus, commitment to the 'West' was no longer so easy to define and practise, if the West itself was divided and the interests were conflicting. However, the controversy between 'Atlanticists' and 'Gaullists' became irrelevant, due to another consequence of the US global policy: After the height of Cold War confrontation between the US and the USSR in the Cuban Missile Crisis in the autumn of 1962, the two superpowers opened a phase of de-escalation and relations with the Eastern Bloc gained importance. NATO's 1967 Harmel Report can be regarded as a milestone in NATO's strategy towards the Warsaw Pact. Also, West Germans cited the *Harmel Report* as the bible of East-West relations, because the report put German division to the centre of Western concerns and defined defence and détente differently, in a comprehensive manner.

The Willy Brandt Era

At the 1969 elections, the SPD received 43% of the votes, whereas the FDP and CDU/CSU received 6% and 46% of the votes, respectively.¹¹ As the FDP preferred to form a coalition with the SPD, Willy Brandt, who had served as foreign minister and vice-chancellor between 1966 and 1969, became the new chancellor of West Germany and served until 1974. The new government brought the impetus with it, for improving the relations with the Eastern Bloc. However, although there was a relaxation in tensions between NATO and Warsaw Pact members, in conformity with the process of détente, and a leftist-led coalition government was in power in West Germany, the perception of threat coming from the Soviet Union did not disappear.

Brandt and his Social Democratic Party realized that the establishment of closer contacts between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic, required an improvement of relations with Eastern Europe and Bonn's territorial recognition of the status quo of Europe's post-World War II borders. For Chancellor Brandt 'small steps were better than none' and 'small steps were better than big words'. Brandt's foreign policy was called *Ostpolitik* that implied 'two states in one nation', through which the GDR would preserve its identity. As mentioned above, *Ostpolitik* aimed at improving relations with the Eastern Bloc. Walter Scheel, who became the President of West Germany on 15 May 1974, stated: '*Ostpolitik* is an expression of the identity of our interests with the interest of Europe'.¹² The Government Declaration of October 1969 recognized the existence of 'two states in Germany' and the Ministry for All-German Questions was renamed as the Ministry for Intra-German Relations. However, it should be noted that *Ostpolitik* was not completely an alternative to Adenauer's *Westpolitik*. The alliance with the West kept its importance and the new foreign policy course was tried to be kept in a compatible manner with the principles and parameters of *Westpolitik*.

¹¹ Siekmeier, Mathias and Larres, Klaus, "Domestic Political Developments II: 1969-90", in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, p. 100.

¹² Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p. 19.

Egon Bahr, Willy Brandt's chief adviser, had suggested a strategy of 'change through rapprochement' in 1963.¹³ According to Bahr, West German strategy should be pursued within the context of 'the policy of transformation' through which East Germany should be transformed with the agreement of the USSR and this was supported by Chancellor Brandt who thought that the German question could only be solved with the USSR, not against it. J. Joffe termed this as 'relaxation through reassurance' between West and East Germany in particular, and East and West in general, through which détente between states in East and West should lead to détente between state and society in the East.¹⁴ This was facilitated by a global détente process: After the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the USSR and the US had recognized the necessity of defusing tensions between the two blocs, which later led to the signing of the SALT I, in 1972. Thus, the relaxation of tensions encouraged the Brandt administration to improve relations with Eastern Europe and implement *Ostpolitik*. *Ostpolitik* contributed to the signing of a host of bilateral treaties between West Germany and the East European countries: negotiations between Bonn and Moscow culminated in the signing of the Moscow Treaty on 12 August, 1970. This accord stipulated the mutual renunciation of force, the acceptance by West Germany of the Oder-Neisse line, the border between Poland and East Germany, and the existing border between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic – all on the condition that a permanent settlement of the border questions was reserved for an eventual peace treaty for the whole of Germany. In December 1970, Bonn signed a treaty with Poland which restated West Germany's pledge to recognize the post-World War II border between Poland and Germany.¹⁵ Both countries also agreed to establish diplomatic relations and renounced the use of force. Chancellor Brandt, during his visit to Poland to sign this treaty, recognized 'Germany's terrible crime against humanity during World War II' and received worldwide attention.¹⁶

¹³ Larres, Klaus, "Germany in 1989: the Development of a Revolution", in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, pp. 36-37.

¹⁴ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p. 177.

¹⁵ McNeill, Terry, "The Soviet Union's Policy Towards West Germany, 1945-90", in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, p. 263.

¹⁶ Steininger, Rolf, "The German Question, 1945-95", in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p. 17.

In September 1971, the four former allied powers (the US, USSR, Britain and France) signed the quadripartite agreement, which guaranteed unimpeded access between West Germany and West Berlin. Whereas the western allies reaffirmed West Berlin's special status, the USSR permitted West Berlin to maintain its ties with West Germany. Subsequent agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were referring to the regulation of the transit traffic of persons and goods, telephone services, as well as cultural and commercial cooperation between the two states. Brandt and his East German counterpart, Willi Stoph met twice in 1970 (in Erfurt and Kassel), but progress towards an understanding between the two German governments could not be made unless Bonn recognized the GDR as a sovereign state. The negotiations resulted in the signing of the Basic Treaty in December 1972, according to which West Germany agreed to recognize the GDR de facto and accept the exchange of permanent representatives (though not ambassadors) between the two states.¹⁷ Within the context of the Basic Treaty there began internal discussions on the issue of recognition of the GDR: Christian Democrats argued that the diplomatic recognition would lead to more substantive recognition of the repressive regime and this would be morally unacceptable for people suffering under this regime. On the other hand, Social and Free Democrats replied that the purely diplomatic recognition did not imply political and moral recognition of the system. On the contrary, the recognition, they argued, was the only practicable way to begin alleviating the hardships imposed by the system.

Chancellor Brandt's major objective in opening relations with Eastern Europe was to pursue *Deutschlandpolitik*. This was Bonn's attempt to improve relations with East Germany through which Brandt hoped to enhance the number of the East Germans (to have a more positive approach towards West Germany) who had been cut off from the West, since the construction of the Berlin Wall. In order to increase the number of East Germans visiting West Germany, 'welcome money' was paid to every East German visitor by the West German governments with a total of DM 2 billion from 1970 to 1989. In addition to this, West German credits to GDR increased for compulsory exchange for pensioners and children, minefields along 'German-German frontier', relaxation of border controls for West German travellers, and increase in numbers of East Germans allowed to travel West. The CDU,

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 18.

as the opposition party in West Germany, adamantly denounced the signing of the treaties with the USSR and Poland, as well as Brandt's recognition of the GDR. According to the CDU, those treaties violated the commitment to unification as had been stated in the Basic Law, the West German constitution. However, in 1972 the CDU's attempt to unseat the Brandt coalition government failed, and since then, up until reunification, *Ostpolitik* and *Deutschlandpolitik* became an integral part of the foreign policy programme of all West German political parties.

At the Moscow Summit of May 1972, the US and the USSR, under the leadership of President R. Nixon and L. Brezhnev, signed accords in order to limit strategic weapons and anti-ballistic missile systems (SALT I). The same year, Brezhnev visited West Germany and emphasized the importance of sustaining long-term Soviet-German economic cooperation and the necessity of relaxation on disputable issues. In 1973 NATO members accepted the Soviet proposal for convening a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in order to establish goals and standards in four fields: security, disarmament, economic cooperation and human rights. All these attempts, together with Bonn's détente policy (with Eastern Europe) and the Basic Treaty (between the FRG and GDR), led to the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. It was signed by the heads of states and governments of 33 European nations and those of the US and Canada. It recognized the post-World War II status quo in Europe, and thus the division of Europe and Germany. Also, by this Act, all participant states agreed on organizing conferences (on the above-mentioned questions), improving relations and deciding on the future activities of this structure.¹⁸

The Helsinki Final Act was, mainly, a trilateral issue: From the US perspective; H. Kissinger, advisor to the Nixon administration in the US, was acting in the old European Realpolitik spirit of Metternich. However, his attitude changed through Helsinki. Following the US defeat in Vietnam and increasing domestic criticism of the US administration, Kissinger tried to secure Soviet acceptance of improving human contacts, information flows and cultural exchange (although he earlier thought human rights was not an appropriate issue for discussions between states). With regard to the Soviet perception of Helsinki, healing Europe's economic division while sealing its political division, and providing recognition of Yalta frontiers, the

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 17.

permanence of Soviet domination and Soviet-type regimes were the basic objectives of Moscow. For West Germany the Helsinki process as Chancellor Schmidt described it, was 'an attempt to cover West German actions multilaterally' in his confidential Marbella paper of 1977. In the negotiation process Kissinger negotiated on West Germany's behalf, the crucial sentence allowing for the possibility of 'a peaceful change of frontiers'. As Foreign Minister Genscher observed in 1975: 'No one can have a greater interest than us Germans in the Conference achieving its goal, namely to improve the contacts between the states and people in Europe... I believe that no one would neglect their national duty more than us, were he to hesitate to use even the smallest chance for a development that could eventually ease the lot of the divided nation.'¹⁹

The Federal Republic and the GDR became members of the United Nations in 1973.²⁰ The establishment of the CSCE and the Helsinki-institutionalized détente in Europe had eroding effects on the communist systems after the conclusion of the Helsinki Charter, when the Communist Bloc had to barter human rights against economic aid from the West.

Parallel to the external developments and the international atmosphere, within which foreign policy was/is formulated, the SPD-led coalition government's foreign policy course gave priority to the process of détente. However, this did not change the NATO-oriented consensus, due to the security dependence on the western allies and the recognition of the validity of simultaneous pursuit of defence/deterrence and détente. Deterrence and forward defence still were the two principal pillars of Western alliance strategy, which remained at the core of West German foreign and security policy orientation. Deterrence implied that potential enemy was to be dissuaded from aggression by a NATO posture, and forward defence implied that if deterrence crumbled, the enemy's attacking armies were to be met and contained as far to the east on NATO territory as possible. From this point, rather than being a total challenge to Adenauer's *Westpolitik*, Brandt's *Ostpolitik* should be evaluated as West Germany's opening window to the East. Instead of maintaining the illusion of unification, the SPD-led coalition government intended to improve the human contacts between the people in

¹⁹ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, pp. 266-267.

²⁰ Geiss, Imanuel, "The Federal Republic of Germany in International Politics Before and After Unification", in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, p. 154.

both parts of Germany. This, they thought, could be achieved by recognizing the GDR as a sovereign state and seeking cooperation with the East German administration on practical matters. The Brandt administration was at least partially successful, because in the 1970s the GDR government relaxed its stringent policies and permitted a limited number of its citizens to visit West Germany in case of a family emergency. Brandt and his *Ostpolitik* left its stamp on the foreign policy of West Germany, but in 1974 W. Brandt resigned as a result of the scandal that his personal adviser was working for the GDR as a spy.²¹

The Helmut Schmidt Era

Following the resignation of Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt (from the SPD) became the new Chancellor of West Germany. Schmidt tried to continue *Ostpolitik*, but he tried to do so in a more compatible manner with *Westpolitik*. For the new Chancellor, the key word in the conduct of interstate relations (and East-West relations in particular) was stability: stability of the overall diplomatic system of *Ostpolitik* with its dual imperative of vertical and horizontal synchronization. Like Kissinger, Schmidt regarded the balance of power as the key to preserving peace in Europe, and international order more generally; and he regarded détente between superpowers as the necessary condition to reduce the division of Berlin and Germany. In pursuing these twin goals, he gave priority to two classical instruments, arms and money. West German-Soviet trade in 1979 was 6 times of the 1969 level. Bismarck had described Germany's role as that of an 'honest broker' between the great powers of East and West, whereas Schmidt described West Germany's role as 'honest interpreters', but honest interpreters 'of Western policy', with 'and of German interests'. Perhaps also 'in Europe's name'.²² The new chancellor reiterated Europe's and West Germany's close partnership with Washington. According to Schmidt, there could not be security without an approximate balance of military power. He thought that a stable East-West balance of power (in the military sphere) was the precondition for any successful détente policy. By the early 1980s the USSR had deployed

²¹ Siekmeier, Mathias and Larres, Klaus, "Domestic Political Developments II: 1969-90" in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, p. 111.

²² Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p. 96.

nearly 1500 nuclear warheads on missiles, having a range of 600 to 3400 miles, called as Soviet SS-20 rockets.²³ Thus Schmidt became determined to strengthen the security of the Atlantic partnership by demanding the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INFs) in Western Europe, in order to offset the Soviet missile build-up in Eastern Europe.

As mentioned above, Schmidt promoted improving West Germany's relations with its western allies. However, this was not a shift from *Ostpolitik* orientation. Actually, the statement of US President J. Carter in 1977 had reminded the West German administration of the necessity of reducing tensions with the USSR and, if possible, improving relations. In 1977 Carter stated that the defence of Western Europe might start at the Weser-Lech rivers. However, it was unacceptable for the FRG due to the fact that one third of the West German territory would have been lost without doing any defensive action. The closeness of the Soviet threat and the statistical forecasting about the extent of nuclear destruction increased the anxiety of West Germany. The mood of détente atmosphere was broken with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Although the US imposed economic sanctions on the USSR, and wanted its allies to do so as well, the Schmidt administration continued growing commercial relations (with the USSR). With the aim of reducing tensions between the two superpowers, Schmidt visited Moscow in 1980. This attempt was evaluated as the West German administration's desire to pursue both *Westpolitik* and *Ostpolitik* in the sense that West Germany was acting within the framework of its NATO alliance, and reflecting Western anxiety about the Afghanistan invasion, and meanwhile, was trying to keep relations with the USSR and not to antagonize Moscow.

The Helmut Kohl Era

The disagreements within the SPD and between the coalition parties, the SPD and the FDP, were increasing. Schmidt's party, the Social Democrats, eventually opposed their own chancellor on the INF deployment issue. Also, differences on economic issues between coalition partners caused the col-

²³ Siekmeier, Mathias and Larres, Klaus, "Domestic Political Developments II: 1969-90", in Larres, Klaus and Panayi, Panikos, eds., *The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1996, p. 100.

lapse of the center-left government in 1982 that had been in power since 1969, and resulted in a *Wende*, a change of government in Bonn. The Christian Democrats formed a coalition with the FDP under Helmut Kohl as Chancellor, on 1 October, 1982. In transition from social-liberal to conservative-liberal government, the new Chancellor brought a blunt neo-Adenauerian reaffirmation of the absolute priority of Western integration on the one hand, and of the long-term commitment to reunification, on the other. In the October 1982 government declaration, first of all, the central importance of the relationship with the US and West Germany's full commitment to NATO alliance was reaffirmed. Second, it reaffirmed West Germany's commitment to move towards what it called 'European Union', inside the existing European Community. Finally, it roundly reasserted the Federal Republic's commitment to the goal of German unity.²⁴ Although a shift from a centre-left to a centre-right coalition took place in 1982, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (the foreign minister since 1974) remained in post and pursued with vigour the *Ostpolitik*. It was Genscher who asked the Western allies to take Gorbachev and his reforms seriously, and who called for stronger economic and technological cooperation between the East and Western Europe. Genscher remained in the centre of the German foreign policy up until 1992, and he is accepted as the architect of Germany's multi-dimensional policy. As a result of his attempts, France and Germany led to the re-activation of the WEU and the formation of Franco-German Security Council in 1988. Kohl and his CDU occasionally reiterated their wish to see Germany united again. In 1987 the Kohl government hosted East German Party Chief Erich Honecker and thus elevated the international status of the GDR, providing it with a greater degree of legitimacy. With the active European policy of the Kohl government Germany's weight in NATO increased, and in 1988 Manfred Wörner was the first German to become the NATO Secretary General.²⁵

Deutschlandpolitik, initiated by the Brandt administration, was continued by the Schmidt and Kohl governments. Actually, a distinction has to be made between *Deutschlandpolitik* and *Ostpolitik*: whereas the first one implied the policy towards East Germany, the latter implied policy towards Eastern Europe and the USSR, and whereas the former was pursued within the con-

²⁴ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p. 100.

²⁵ Nigel, Thomas, "Modern Germany, Politics, Society and Culture", edited by Peter James, Routledge, 1998, pp. 10-12.

text of internal politics, the latter was pursued within the context of foreign policy. Although the rapprochement continued, in 1987 the unification of the two Germanys seemed to be as remote as ever. Not too long before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Honecker even predicted that the Wall would still exist in fifty or hundred years. Also, the West German Social Democrats and Greens viewed the division of Germany as permanent.²⁶ However, reforms in the USSR, initiated by the Soviet President M. Gorbachev (who came to power in 1985), contributed to demands for political and economic changes in Eastern Europe, including the GDR citizens. The GDR celebrated its fortieth anniversary on 7 October, 1989. Gorbachev, in his speech commemorating the anniversary, alluded to the vulnerability of the GDR's communist regime when he cautioned the GDR leaders that 'life punishes those who come too late'.²⁷ This created large-scale demonstrations among East German citizens, requesting major political reforms. The opening of the Hungarian border to Austria on 2 May 1989 triggered the collapse of the Berlin Wall. The Berlin Wall unexpectedly collapsed on 9 November 1989. Less than three weeks after the collapse Chancellor Kohl presented a ten-point proposal to the Bundestag, suggesting the creation of 'confederate structures' with the goal of creating a 'federal state order', which would end the division of Germany.²⁸ The possibility of German reunification raised the question of the creation of a 'Fourth Reich'. Initially, the USSR rejected reunification, and British and French politicians and officials expressed their reservations. Germany's closest ally, the US, strongly supported German reunification, and strong cooperation between President George Bush and Chancellor Kohl, as well as between the Foreign Ministers James Baker and Genscher, was important in the reunification process. Soviet President Gorbachev agreed to reunification, in principle, in January 1990.

In May 1990 the East and West German governments signed a treaty on the economic and social union between the two countries, which came into effect on 2 July 1990. The treaty permitted the East Germans to exchange their valueless East German *Ostmark* for West German Deutsche-Marks on

²⁶ Steininger, Rolf, "The German Question, 1945-95", in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p. 18.

²⁷ Moens, Alexander, "American Diplomacy and German Unification", *Survival*, Vol. 33 No. 6, November/December 1991, p. 532.

²⁸ Larres, Klaus, "Germany in 1989: the Development of a Revolution", in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p. 52.

the basis of a one-to-one rate. The chance of East Germans to participate in the prosperity of the Western world brought about their desire for immediate reunification. During Kohl's visit to the USSR in July 1990, the Chancellor proposed to limit the German armed forces to 370.000. In turn, President Gorbachev granted reunified Germany full sovereignty and permitted Germany to maintain its membership in NATO. In 1989 and 1990 Bonn was Moscow's single most important partner in the West, and what Bonn wanted in return was progress in *Deutschlandpolitik*. The FRG and the USSR reached agreements in September 1990 for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany by the end of 1994. Chancellor Kohl promised to finance (totalling to 8 billion dollars) the gradual removal of troops.²⁹ Also, in order to remove France's fears of a strong Germany in the middle of Europe, Kohl reassured the French President Mitterand that unified Germany would be bound to the European Community, the ideal of the European integration and Franco-German cooperation. The 'Two-Plus-Four' powers' treaty (two Germanys, the US, USSR, France and Britain), signed in Moscow on 12 September 1990, granted full sovereignty to reunified Germany and was a prerequisite for the actual reunification.

In West Germany the year 1945 was often referred to as *Stunde Null* ('hour zero'). That is why *Ostpolitik* was considered as *Erste Stunde* ('hour one'). The beginning of the Cold War had partitioned Germany and the Germans became the principal beneficiaries of its demise. The long process of diplomacy resulted in the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990.

²⁹ Steininger, Rolf, "The German Question, 1945-95", in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, pp. 24-25.

Parameters of West German Foreign Policy in the Pre-Reunification Period

West Germany made a remarkable transition from war, defeat and occupation to the establishment and stabilization of a reliable political system and acceptance as an equal partner in the international community. The transition process included the problems of rebuilding a destroyed country, restructuring a shattered economy, launching a workable governmental system, which met both the needs of the German people and of “the Western allies”. In addition to them, terminating the occupation, regaining for West Germany a place in the society of nations as a welcome participant and ally and to do so through joining the international organizations were the primary objectives of the West German foreign and security policy.

The process of transition can be divided into three main phases. The first commenced with the Nazi surrender and was characterized by Allied occupation, the destruction of Germany’s military might and the marshalling of a concerted program to keep it demilitarized. It should be underlined that although the occupying powers failed to agree in advance about a new European political arrangement to stabilize continental relations, they were unanimous in their decision to deny Germany the facility and opportunity of challenging the peace and threatening the security of its neighbours. Then it was no surprise that when the Basic Law of West Germany was drafted in 1949, it denied a defence function to the new Federal Government. During the immediate post-surrender years, German security was of little concern to the occupying powers, and foreign relations were handled by the Allies. However, with the commencement of the Cold War and the birth of the West and East German governments, the Western allies assumed responsibility for West German security. Parallel to this, the USSR incorporated East Germany into its orbit.

The second phase was a major policy shift, characterized by the negotiations of a controlled West German military contribution to Western defence, and the beginning of the integration of West Germany into an emerging European community. This phase consisted of four major interrelated developments. The first one was the issue of the management of the West German steel industry. West Germany was admitted as a partner into the In-

ternational Authority for the Ruhr (which controlled German steel production) in 1949. Two years later this was superseded by the European Coal and Steel Community that marked the first major step for European integration. The keystone of this phase was the negotiation of the European Defense Community and European Political Community treaties, which were signed in 1952 and 1953. These provided, respectively, for a fully integrated European military establishment, functioning as a supranational force under a unified command, to which West Germany would consign manpower and resources (without creating a national army), and for a West European federation with limited, though genuine, authority of governance. However, the French National Assembly rejected the Defence Community Treaty in 1954, and the Political Community Treaty went to governments for approval, but failed to re-emerge.

Related to the plan to incorporate West German troops into a European defense force, the issue became the matter of affiliating West Germany with the North Atlantic Alliance.³⁰ Simultaneously with the negotiation of the Defence Community Treaty, the western allies agreed in 1952 to invite West Germany to become an associate member under the North Atlantic Treaty, and signed a protocol to this effect in Paris. However, when the French government defaulted on the approval of the Defence Community Treaty, agreement on the process of West German affiliation with the North Atlantic alliance was deferred. The final aspect of the second phase was the internal West German constitutional manoeuvre to empower the Federal Republic to exercise the defence function. Although the West German Parliament had debated and approved the Defence Community Treaty for ratification, the legality of this action had been challenged in the Federal Constitutional Court. With the amendment of the Basic Law in 1954, the West German government was granted exclusive authority over the national defence of West Germany.

As mentioned above, French rejection of the Defence Community Treaty obliged the western allies to turn from integrating West German troops into an amalgamated European force, to creating a separate national West German military establishment. The 1954 London and Paris negotiations introduced the third phase of the West German security development. The principal components of the solution were the creation of the *Bundeswehr* (the

³⁰ Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomacy*, New York: Touchstone, 1994, p. 515.

West German Military Force), the framing of a formula for its international control that was accomplished by incorporating it within the combined North Atlantic Treaty forces, and the creation of a European political institution for maintaining restrictions on certain West German military functions. The last of these was the Western European Union, created by amending The Brussels Treaty in 1954 to admit West Germany and Italy into membership, and prescribe certain controls on West German arms manufacture.³¹ Actually, in the third phase, the Atlantic Allies agreed to empower West Germany to create its own national, but not independent, military establishment, and to accept it as a full partner in the North Atlantic Alliance. This offered West Germany a new and better position, respecting its national defence and European security, and achieving foreign policy objectives.

At this point, to analyze the West German 'national purpose/basic objectives/foreign policy system' will be meaningful in order to identify the parameters and understand the evolution of foreign policy. In terms of national purpose, that of West Germany can be stated as the restoration of German unity in freedom and peace – or, more fully, as the revival by peaceful procedures of a reunified, respected, and respectable Germany in control of its own internal affairs and fulfilling its proper role in international relations. With regard to the country's fundamental goals, achieving and sustaining national identity, preserving national security, maintaining the peace and enhancing the general welfare can be stated as the country's basic objectives. The third layer, namely the foreign policy system, emphasizes the public policies designed to achieve the above-mentioned fundamental goals.³²

In terms of national identity and international status, to achieve acknowledgement as an honourable member of the family of nations; acquire sovereign status and acceptance as an equal partner in the international community; obtain diplomatic recognition by, and establish diplomatic relations with, as many foreign governments as possible (with reservation concerning governments recognizing East Germany – up until the early 1970s); and gain acceptance into the membership of international organizations, were the main objectives of the West German administrations. West Germany, in terms of national security, aimed to forestall aggression against the integrity

³¹ Plischke, Elmer, *Contemporary Governments of Germany*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969, p. 249.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 250.

of the FRG; provide for its own security to a feasible extent; affiliate with other countries to establish guarantees of collective security; create a West German military establishment – though not necessarily an independent military force (that is to say, to create it within a multilateral framework); avoid the development of such a powerful, independent military force as to produce forceful counteraction; support mutual disarmament (between the two blocs), but not the neutralization of West Germany; and buttress national security by affiliating with defensive alliances (like NATO and WEU).

With regard to the issue of Berlin (and the status of Berlin), West Germany tried to maintain freedom from Communist aggression and tried to prevent the control or incorporation of West Berlin into East Germany; integrate West Berlin into the Federal Republic as a constituent Land (state) – full integration, or as complete as possible, while preserving four-power commitments regarding all of Berlin; prevent the establishment of a ‘free city’ in West Berlin, or even for all Berlin – reject the ‘third Germany’ concept. In addition to this, the basic parameters of West Germany’s reunification policy can be cited as follows: achieve reunification by the self-determination of the entire German people; negotiate by peaceful means; acquire by democratic process – through popular elections, constitutional assembly, ratification referendum, and the establishment of the government of a unified state, and election of officials; reject Communist order; hold the division of Germany to be unnatural and intolerable; oppose the ‘two Germanies’ policy; and regard reunification as an internal, rather than international, matter, so far as German policy and action are concerned. For the West German elite, West German administrations and political parties, the German Question and the European Question were closely related. For most Germans, as Timothy G. Ash called it, the ‘Yalta Order’, ‘the division of Germany was the division of European continent’ and ‘to overcome division of Germany is simultaneously to overcome the division of Europe’. As Chancellor Schmidt wrote in his memoirs: ‘... there was hardly a government in Europe which genuinely regretted the partition of Germany. That was more the case in Washington or distant Peking. ... The world thus seemed to be quite content with the division of Germany; illogically it was much less content with the division of Europe’.³³

³³ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe’s Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p. 19.

The other parameters (and priorities) of West German foreign policy can be stated as follows: integrate the European Communities – by supranational “federalism”: unite West and Central Europe – by limited “confederation”;³⁴ end the division of Europe into two opposing, un-cooperating axes; achieve European political and power stabilization; develop influence in international affairs commensurate with the realities of West German power status; play significant, recognized and respected role in international political affairs; and join international organizations for collective purposes.

Within the context of the formulation and implementation of foreign and security policies, West German administrations repeatedly stated that the ‘will to preserve peace and to promote international understanding is...the first and the primary concern of the West German foreign policy’.³⁵ Parallel to this, they renounced the use or threat of force for the attainment of their political aims, they claimed that their policies and objectives were not intended as a threat to any country, and that they seek ‘change’ only by peaceful negotiations.

In the 1950s Chancellor Adenauer articulated West Germany’s trio of vital interests as (1) the security of West Germany; (2) the maintenance of the (existing) political, legal and economic ties between Berlin and West Germany; and (3) the achievement of reunification, together with the non-recognition of the East German regime and the settlement of frontier questions in a peace treaty with an all-German government. The Adenauer Government also laid down most of the basic objectives of West Germany as follows: principles of national identity and respectability, European integration, international cooperation, trade development, Franco-German rapprochement and self-determination (in order to reflect Berlin and reunification issues as internal problems).³⁶ Thus it can be argued that in the 1950s the West German government tended to conceive of West German policy from the focal point of the ‘national security/reunification/Berlin’ relationship, and tried to do so through aligning itself with the Western powers. However, in the 1960s the focus shifted so that the policy complex was more accurately describable as a ‘national security/German reunification/European unity/power-prestige/détente’ configuration.

³⁴ Plischke, Elmer, *Contemporary Governments of Germany*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969, p. 253.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

In addition to the above-mentioned foreign policy objectives, in terms of general principles, in defining security policy the West German administrations insisted that West German independence and territorial integrity (together with that of West Berlin) had to be inviolable. West Germany based its security largely on two principles, namely, alliance with the North Atlantic powers and balanced East-West arms limitation. Fundamentally, West German alliance policy consisted of acquiring and contributing to credible and guaranteed collective deterrent vis-à-vis potential aggressors, and possessing reliable nuclear protection without becoming a nuclear power. From this point, defence by means of a western coalition, with the crucial participation of the US, was the most preferred option of West Germany, because it appeared to be the least expensive and most trustworthy arrangement for effective security assurance and military deterrence. Thus, the NATO Alliance and the enthusiastic participation of the US (for European security against Soviet expansionism) were the main pillars of West German security policy.

West Germany, emerging from occupation in 1949, had more restrictions on its course of foreign and defence policy development than would normally be the case. It, therefore, began with less freedom of choice. However, in order to take full advantage of policy flexibility, West German foreign and security policy-makers tried to project all potential policy options and establish both the optimal and the minimally acceptable priorities with respect to their desirability and feasibility. Thus, to turn the foreign and security policy formulation process into a process of widening alternatives became the prior objective of West German policy-makers. In order to achieve this objective, West Germany signed treaties with its Western allies in the early 1950s, and with its Eastern neighbours in the early 1970s. While the former enabled West Germany to operate as an 'independent' state in the West, the latter enabled it to operate as an 'independent' state in the East. West Germany wanted its Western neighbours and allies to be as concerned as possible about the European question, while, at the same time, building the German question into the centre of the European one. However, it should be mentioned that although the 1970 treaties were the elements of a *modus vivendi*, they were in no sense part of any final, legally binding peace settlement for Germany.

During the Cold War West German administrations were confronted with East-West antagonism as the dominating conflict in Europe. The Soviet Union was regarded as the main challenger. However, although West

Germany was still a front-state, even under the conditions of strategic parity, economic leverage was increasing in value. In addition to this, following the mid-1980s, another view evolved among the government parties: security was begun to be seen as a 'broad term'. This is to say, the traditional understanding of threat as consisting of clearly defined antagonists with hostile intentions and a capacity for attack was slowly giving way to a risk assessment based on emerging challenges and instabilities in the Euro-Atlantic region and the global architecture. Thus, traditional worst case thinking was replaced by scenarios of the worst *probable* cases, and following the disintegration of the communist bloc, security turned into a 'holistic approach of protecting and shaping'. As the former Defense Minister V. R uhe reached the conclusion in his defence guidelines, a broad concept of security had to incorporate aspects of domestic stability as well as transnational dimensions.³⁷

As later foreseen in the 1994 White Paper of the Federal Ministry of Defence, changed circumstances necessitate a broader understanding of security.³⁸ Thus, although by 1992 the Warsaw Treaty Organization became defunct and a part of history, Germany remained (and still remains) a front-state in one sense: it was/is still on the border of a region, in which ethnic, national and religious strife was/is continuing. Economic difficulties and social dislocation with its particular symptoms, such as migration to the West, replaced Germany's former enemy perception. Due to the (and further increasing) masses of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, on 2 October 1992 the former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stated that 'Our domestic stability is beginning to rock'.³⁹ This made Germany pursue a foreign and security policy strategy, whose political and military aim was called 'neighbourhood stability', and the strategic concerns focused on 'security in and for Europe'. Thus, openness towards Central and Eastern Europe became a central issue for German foreign and security policy-makers. That is why since the mid-1980s the Kohl government began to act as an advocate for Eastern Europe in international forums, and since then Germany began

³⁷ Gutjahr, Lothar, "Stability, Integration and Global Responsibility: Germany's Changing Perspectives on National Interests", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1995, p. 313.

³⁸ Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser, Karl, "Academic Research and Foreign Policy-Making", in Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser, Karl, eds., *Germany's New Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 8.

³⁹ Gutjahr, Lothar, "Stability, Integration and Global Responsibility: Germany's Changing Perspectives on National Interests", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 21, No.3, July 1995, p. 314.

to provide the bulk of financial aid to post-Communist East European countries. As Chancellor Kohl stated: ‘A preventive security policy... includes economic and social stability.’⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 314-315.

2. *The Post-Unification Period*

Following the end of the Cold War traditional issues may not have disappeared, but increasingly concerned problems requiring cooperation between state and non-state actors, as well as approaches which go far beyond the confines of nation state have come to the forefront. Nuclear and energy security, preventive crisis management, sustainable economic growth, protection of the environment, fight against international terrorism-crime-illegal migration, and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have become critical issues in the conduct of inter-state relations. Although the central task of foreign relations is that of maintaining peace by preventing political instability and military conflicts, the post-Cold War international structure and international developments necessitated the concept of security to be understood in a much broader sense.⁴¹

On the other hand, in 1990 John Mearsheimer, a well-known academician on security issues and international politics, predicted all kinds of things that would happen in world politics after the demise of the bipolar Cold War system: the disintegration of NATO, the dismemberment of the EU and a powerful and assertive Germany that might go nuclear.⁴² Also, the neo-realist school predicted a repositioning of the Great Powers – through which Germany, liberated from the chains of divided Europe, would reassume its role as a ‘Great Power’. However, this prognosis has been replaced by empirical analysis, according to which continuity dominates change in Germany’s foreign policy. Germany has been a key player in the process of deepening and widening the EU and NATO. It has promoted major regulations in the fields of arms control, non-proliferation (signing of the NPT), international criminal law, CFE Treaty, and the creation of the International Criminal Court. Germany has pushed for deregulation in agriculture within the context of the WTO. Thus, Germany has come close to resembling a civilian power: a state that is willing to take the initiative and influence interna-

⁴¹ Von Ploetz, Hans-Friedrich, “New Challenges for the Foreign Service”, in Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter and Kaiser, Karl, eds., *Germany’s New Foreign Policy*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, p. 70.

⁴² Mearsheimer, John J., “Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security”, *International Security*, Vol. 15 No.3, Winter 1990/1991, pp. 219-222.

tional politics through strategies that include the monopolization of force within a collective security system, the non-violent resolution of disputes and the strengthening of the rule of law.⁴³ It should not be assumed that power or interests have been absent from Germany's post-Cold War foreign policy. Instead, it is argued that these factors were perceived through the distinct set of norms and values, embodied in the civilian power role. The basic orientations of German foreign policy can be cited as follows:

1. Fundamental support for European integration as a basic policy objective. This support is channelled through the Community system, and therefore implies support for European institutions. As Henning Tewes, Deputy Director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Poland since 1998, argues, Germany's support for deepening and widening the EU, and NATO enlargement policy, fits the ideal type civilian power. The former German Defence Minister Volker Rühle launched the enlargement debate in a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, initially reluctant, also came round to pushing for NATO expansion just before the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994. In a speech to the diplomatic corps in Bonn on December 1994, Kohl emphasized:

The Atlantic Alliance is the guarantor of security and stability not only for its own members, but also for all Europe. An important foundation of it remains the close connection with North America and the permanent stationing of American soldiers in Europe...A gradual enlargement of NATO has to be seen in close relationship with the enlargement of the European Union and the WEU as part of a pan-European strategy. Such a strategy must be developed in close contact with Russia. Russia rightfully expects a place that corresponds to its status and dignity. The accession of new members to NATO must therefore be complemented by broad cooperation above all with Russia and Ukraine.⁴⁴

2. Support for economic and monetary union (within the EU) is a major policy objective of Germany. The appearance of EMU in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty was adopted by Germany and Chancellor Kohl clearly staked

⁴³ Maull, Hans, "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69. No.5, Winter 1990/91, pp. 91-106.

⁴⁴ Kranz, Jerzy, "Germany, Quo Vadis? A view from Poland", *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No.1, April 2001, p. 152.

his political career on its success. Germany had to expect advantages from the EMU to accept it, that is, to agree to give up its monetary independence and the Deutsche Mark. Several devices were designed to establish EMU following the German model. Since Germany was the essential pivot of the mechanism, the German government retained a veto power over the whole venture and could thus impose its blueprint on its partners. Germany played a crucial role in shaping the rules of EMU, like low inflation and stable currency. Also, the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) on the Deutsche Bundesbank model and location of the European Monetary Institute, the forerunner of the ECB, in Frankfurt am Main (a city which is also the seat of the Deutsche Bank), is evaluated as the success of German policy-makers.⁴⁵

3. Free trade is another dynamic of Germany's economic and foreign policy. Germany has been traditionally on the liberal side of the permanent international community debate on foreign trade issues. Actually, since the beginning of the Cold War it had been thought in Bonn and Washington that the economic power of the West would be a major, perhaps the major, instrument of achieving Western political goals in the East – 'change through trade'. That is why US President Nixon worked on trade liberalization and economic inducements to the USSR, and the Carter administration attempted an 'economic diplomacy of leverage and linkage'.⁴⁶ The reunification has not changed this aspect, for instance in the end-game of the Uruguay Round in the autumn of 1993, Germany strongly supported the implementation of liberal trade policies.

4. Firm accent on the Franco-German relationship, without alienating smaller countries, is also crucial for Germany. As a former representative of a small country in the European negotiating process for a number of years, Germany has been the most sensitive to the preoccupations and complexes of smaller member states, and especially its neighbours. Recent examples of this could be found in the Amsterdam negotiations of 1997, where there was some tension between big and small countries. Franco-German rapprochement has been considered as the 'motor' of European integration. German initiatives in the EU have tended to be developed in concert with the

⁴⁵ Smith, Eric Owen, "The German Model and European Integration", in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p. 153.

⁴⁶ Ash, Timothy G., *In Europe's Name*, New York: Random House, 1993, p. 249.

French. The Franco-German relationship is at the heart of the view of the EU as a community of values and peace. The relation has been so highly institutionalized that there were 115 meetings between the German Chancellor and the French President between 1982 and 1992.⁴⁷

5. Conciliatory attitudes in cases of tension or conflicting views with the United States are another dimension of German foreign policy. This policy, which has deep and obvious roots in the Cold War period, seems to have been constantly maintained, even after the demise of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Berlin Wall. It is an integral part of German European policy.

6. Openness towards Central and Eastern Europe is crucial for German foreign policy. Germany played an important role in the decision taken by successive European Councils, starting in Copenhagen in 1993, to open negotiations with a dozen Eastern and Central European countries. The basic objective that the eastern borders of Germany should no longer be the European Union's borders, has remained valid. As a high-ranking German diplomat stated: 'Germany wants Western countries on its Eastern border'. Former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in his speech on 12 November 1996 stated:

The enlargement is our enlightened self-interest, it means peace and stability for the whole of Europe. We will also profit from it economically, for only as a big pan-European community will have a chance in the global competition tomorrow... For German business, Central and Eastern Europe has become one of the most important growing markets worldwide. Roughly a half of the entire EU's trade with the Central and East European reform states is conducted by Germany... The Central and Eastern European countries' share of our foreign trade now exceeds 9 per cent and has thus overtaken our trade with the USA... Almost one tenth of German foreign direct investments go today to Central and Eastern Europe. Germany is the biggest foreign investor in the region. The fear that every Deutsche Mark invested in Central and Eastern Europe will ultimately endanger jobs at home is groundless. Our companies' investment activities are motivated by the goal of capturing new and potential markets.

⁴⁷ Boyer, Yves, "France and Britain", in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, p. 243.

The German Institute for Economic Research has proven unequivocally in a study that the opening of Eastern Europe creates more jobs for us too and this necessitates a structural change.⁴⁸

7. The budgetary problem is not new in the internal debate in Germany. Already in the middle of the 1970s, German press was defining Germany as Europe's 'milking cow' (*Milchkuh Europas*). However, the demand for a reduction in Germany's EU budget (by 1997 EU's budget totalled ECU 74.5 billion, 28.4 per cent -gross- was contributed by Germany)⁴⁹ has recently become more insistent and general, and has been taken up by prominent political figures. The issue played a significant (negative) role in the discussions on Agenda 2000.

8. The free circulation of persons, including political asylum and immigration, has become a major issue, as a result of a massive influx of refugees, including several hundred thousands from the former Yugoslavia (up to 500.000 Croatian and Slovenian workers in Germany),⁵⁰ combined with a high level of unemployment.

Reconciling these priorities is not easy and in implementing such a foreign policy agenda, Germany confronts with some problems and challenges, like:

- Being able to cooperate with Washington, Paris and Moscow on issues where there is a big distance between the three powers (without nonetheless becoming 'everybody's darling', an expression used at the time of unification by Willy Brandt) is a difficult task to achieve.
- The economic difficulties of Moscow and the fragile political order is an issue of special attention for German policy-makers. Germany has been the major foreign investor in Russian economy. Paradoxically, according to one view, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact brought insecurity to the region, because NATO has begun to be discussed in the sense of its undefined tasks and responsibilities (after the Cold War). Moscow has

⁴⁸ Kranz, Jerzy, "Germany, Quo Vadis? A view from Poland", *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No.1, April, 2001, p. 152.

⁴⁹ Smith, Eric Owen, "The German Model and European Integration", in Larres, Klaus, ed., *Germany Since Unification: The Domestic and External Consequences*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1998, p. 155.

⁵⁰ Bağcı, Hüseyin, *Güvenlik Politikaları ve Risk Analizi Çerçevesinde: Balkanlar (1991-1993)*, Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1994, p. 56.

stated that NATO's eastern enlargement has been considered as hostile, and could not be tolerated. Germany follows a role of mediator between its western allies and Moscow, both geographically and politically. On the one hand, it supports NATO enlargement, on the other hand, it does not want to underestimate Russia's sensitivity. In a speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on 19 April, 1995, Klaus Kinkel said: 'We cannot show less understanding and patience towards the democratic forces in Moscow than we showed in former times to the Communist apparatchiks. As long as Russia says "yes" to a partnership with Europe and the USA, we have to say "yes" to a partnership with Russia'. In his speech to the International Bertelsman Forum at Petersburg on 20 January, 1996, Kinkel went further:

The enlargement of EU, not to mention that of NATO, cannot be achieved with our backs to Russia! The potential candidates for accession must also know this. Against this background, I have welcomed President Kwasniewski's emphasis on an active Polish *Ostpolitik*... I say today to Russia: we have faith in the reform forces in Russia and reckon with the reforms' success... The creation of a community of interest between Russia and EU is also the high road (*Königsweg*) to common security in Europe. I am convinced therefore that, from the perspective of our Polish or Hungarian friends, the priority must be accession to EU, not that to NATO.⁵¹

- Some anxieties relating to the issue of a European defence identity, like the aim of reconciling the US military presence in Europe with European identity, including some possible divergences between Germany and the US, concerning the role of instrument of economic pressure, are another difficulty for German foreign policy-makers.

Difficulties in coordinating policies between Germany and France in relation to the military wing of NATO, deepening the EU and the operation of the monetary union, also create problems for Germany.

⁵¹ Kranz, Jerzy, "Germany, Quo Vadis? A view from Poland", *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No.1, April, 2001, p. 152.

Although there was/is no radical shift in Germany's foreign policy since the reunification of the country, the region, or the international system within which the foreign policy process is shaped has changed. For the first time in history Germany is not faced with a perceivable external threat, and does not have enemies surrounding it. The bipolar structure of international politics ended, and with socialization (in the international community) Germany found its place as a civilian power. German policy was guided by two, somewhat contradictory principles: On the one hand, deepening and widening European and Transatlantic institutions, and the principle of extending democracy towards its Eastern neighbours has been a primary objective; on the other hand, the principle of peaceful and close relations with Russia has been a special issue of attention. Both principles simultaneously led to intensified cooperation with Russia, bilaterally and multilaterally. Germany's leading role as an initiator of the NATO-Russia Founding Act (on 27 May 1997) and the institutionalization of the CSCE, is explained by its contradictory role, which called for both peace with Russia and democracy in East and Central Europe. Also, NATO's self-understanding began to change from being a community of destiny and a community of purpose to a community of values. Germany's policy in two EU treaty negotiations, Maastricht 1990/91 and Amsterdam 1996/97, reflects that Germany's foreign policy role indeed shaped the evolution of Germany's pro-integrationist stance.⁵² A role conflict between deepening European integration in the political area (CFSP) and Germany's basic predisposition in European affairs to side with France when push comes to shove, can be identified as being at the core of German foreign policy. Germany was one of the key supporters of the institutionalization of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), even after the Kohl government had secured the acceptance of German unification at the CSCE summit in Paris (in November 1990). From 1991 to 1993 Bonn pushed for both the broadening (geography and issue areas) and deepening of the OSCE (limitation of veto-power through consensus),⁵³ despite the scepticism of its main European and transatlantic partners.

As another aspect of Germany's foreign policy, Germany's non-proliferation policy in the 1990s, is evaluated with the expectation that a re-

⁵² Harnisch, Sebastian, "Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy", *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No. 1, April, 2001, p. 39.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

unified Germany will and should reassess its non-nuclear weapon state status, in order to maximize its autonomy vis-à-vis its nuclear armed allies. It is argued that Germany's nuclear weapons policy is solely interest-based, and that Germany will remain a non-nuclear state as long as it 'enjoys' the nuclear protection of the US, France and the UK. Germany abandoned a major non-proliferation initiative in 1993, after receiving hefty criticism from its nuclear allies. It supported the positions of friendly nuclear-armed states in 1996, in the context of a ruling of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, and in 1998, when the US attacked presumed terrorist targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. In defiance of its multilateral inclinations, the German government still insists on the use of highly enriched uranium in the nuclear research reactor in Garching (Bavaria). In a similar move, the Kohl government showed reluctance to support a more intrusive nuclear verification regime, when the IAEA launched the '93+2' reform of the IAEA safeguards system. The Schröder government has committed itself to the eventual termination of the commercial use of nuclear energy. In addition, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer acted upon the coalition agreement's provision that the first use of nuclear weapons be renounced, in a NATO debate.⁵⁴ There is a very similar analysis on German human rights policies, which clearly reflects the importance of norms and values as factors shaping German foreign policy behaviour. Germany's performance and important role as an initiator and facilitator in the process of establishing the International Criminal Court is a good example.

The Effects of Reunification: 'Modified Continuity'

There are different views about the effects of reunification on German foreign policy. According to one view, Germany's policy record in the 1990s can be described as one of 'modified continuity'. The continuity thesis argues that post-unification Germany stuck to its treasured policy of active integration and broad international cooperation. Through the successful closure of the German Question, however, the mix of the constituting ego- and alter-part of Germany's role conception changed. Alter-expectations still played an important part of Germany's role perception. First, the family of

⁵⁴ Harnisch, Sebastian, "Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy", *German Politics*, Vol.10. No.1, April, 2001, pp. 40-41.

Western democracies continued to figure prominently as the normative focal point of the German nation in the official rhetoric. Second, as German decision-makers were never tired of pointing out after the Gulf War, the reunified Germany was facing 'larger responsibilities' in Europe and beyond. US President George Bush's call to Germany, in May 1989, for 'partnership in leadership', was preparing the ground for fulfilling responsibilities and pursuing a more active foreign policy.⁵⁵ In a similar vein, the ego-part of Germany's foreign policy role concept underwent a significant change after reunification in the sense that they are based on 'a sense of achievement and confirmation', because never before in history had Germany been at peace with its neighbours, unified, democratic and free. As several key players (politicians and International Relations academicians) pointed out, Germany had found its place in Europe. The liberal and institutionalist views stress that globalization and the growing interdependence among states (with the spread of commerce) have made it impossible for states to pursue independent policies. In sum, they identify three mechanisms to explain continuity in Germany's foreign policy role conception in the 1990s: first the sense of achievement among Germany's elites to be able to close 'the German question' through a democratic, peaceful and satisfied republic that is deeply embedded in an integrated Europe; second, through the successful export of the German model of an independent central bank to the European level; and third, through the strong alter-expectations of its partners, especially the Central and East European countries. As Germany's European policy is concerned, the former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Belgium, Pierre Harmel, argued that 'Germany, like every other European power knows very well that political stage has become global. She knows that she cannot, alone, manage a world policy... If Germany is today reunified, as we have always wished, it is because she has been, in every instance, faithful to her European and Atlantic commitments.'⁵⁶ Within the boundaries of the German European policy, some commentators have alluded to a so-called 'Britishization' of German European policy, implying that in the future this policy will be less committed to integration, more sceptical towards new integration proposals, more doubtful about common policies and less suppor-

⁵⁵ Haftendorn, Helga, "Gulliver in the Centre of Europe: International Involvement and National Capabilities for Action", in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, p. 108.

⁵⁶ De Schoutheete, Philippe, 'Germany, Quo Vadis? A View from the Diplomatic World', *German Politics*, Vol.10. No.1, April, 2001, pp. 139-140.

tive of common institutions, that is to say, closer to the views formulated in London up to 1997. State Secretary von Ploetz from the Bonn Foreign Office stated openly the view that German European policy had become 'more British': 'The Germans asked themselves increasingly what benefits forfeiting sovereignty in (European) integration issue area would bring and whether it would not be better to stick to loose cooperation...'. 'I'm not pro-integrationist' added Kohl's European policy adviser Joachim Bitterlich, thus making clear what Kohl had suggested on earlier occasions for the federal government, and continued: 'The expansion of EU competences (*Ver-gemeinschaftung*) is no longer an article of faith and if better results can be achieved by the normal method of loose cooperation outside of the rules of EU, then there is no reason to go further along the course of integration...'»⁵⁷ It is clear, therefore, that the Germans are asking more than ever about the costs and benefits of the European integration process.

A New Assertiveness?

Germany's power became the focus of numerous studies and the description of Germany has been problematic: Germany as a *Zentralmacht* ('central power'), as a *Weltmacht wider Willen* ('world power against its will') or as a *Zivilmacht* ('civilian power'). Chancellor Schröder himself did not shy away from referring to Germany as an important power, a *Grosse Macht* ('big power'), but he avoided the word *Grossmacht* ('great power'), a word laden with past history.⁵⁸ Germans themselves speak of being more *selbstbenusst*, a term that is difficult to translate, but implies an assertive self-confidence based on self-awareness. Germans often describe Germany as a 'motor' of European integration. However, they are sensitive about the notion of 'leadership' which is translated into *Führer* in German. George Bush's May 1989 call for a 'partnership in leadership' between Germany and America left Bonn awkward and Bonn's European partners wary. Still, it signalled a pronounced American desire to see Germany assuming a larger role in Europe. The US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, speaking in Bonn shortly before the Kosovo War, echoed this objective, stating: 'We recognize and

⁵⁷ Kranz, Jerzy, "Germany, Quo Vadis? A view from Poland", *German Politics*, Vol.10 No.1, April 2001, p. 153.

⁵⁸ Le Gloannec, Anne-Marie, "Germany's Power and the Weakening of States in a Globalised World: Deconstructing a Paradox", *German Politics*, Vol.10 No.1, April 2001, p. 117.

welcome the role of the Federal Republic at the epicentre of these processes-expansion and integration, broadening and deepening.⁵⁹ Thus it has become entirely legitimate for Germany to seek greater influence in return for contributions (economic and logistic contributions to its allies within the institutional structures – EU and NATO, and in their military operations, like in the Gulf War, IFOR and SFOR; as will be studied in the following parts).

Hüseyin Bağcı has underlined three important shifts in German foreign policy motives, brought about by the reunification: the first aspect is that reunification started a re-Germanization process in foreign policy. Whereas Germany was determining its foreign policy orientation and objectives within an institutional framework (through NATO and Community principles) in the pre-unification period, the ‘universal leadership’ aim began to come to surface. The second point to be underlined is that Germany did not give up its policy and objective of European integration, but it wants to be the decider of foreign and security policies, as the greatest economy of the Union (and major contributor to the Union budget). Thirdly, Germany’s domestic political expectations and problems began to have a priority on foreign policy formulation and this gave way to interest-based policy.⁶⁰ Germany’s new assertiveness has often been discussed with regard to Germany’s early insistence on recognizing Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, when most of the European powers (France and Britain) wanted to slow down the process. This issue became the test case in which Germany tried its new role, in which German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher played an active role. Although his colleagues in Brussels (the EC members and the US) stated that recognition would make the situation worse, Genscher said (on 27 November, 1991) that his country would announce recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on 19 December, 1991. Due to strong pressure from Germany, the EC members stated that they would recognize the former Yugoslav Republics on 15 January, under conditions of respect for democracy and minority rights, and acceptance of UN-EC peace efforts. The member states stated the necessity of waiting for the final decision of an expert panel working on the issue, the Badinter Commission (sent by the EC to the region un-

⁵⁹ Denison, Andrew, “German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations Since Unification”, *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No. 1, April, 2001, p. 160.

⁶⁰ Bağcı, Hüseyin, *Güvenlik Politikaları ve Risk Analizi Çerçevesinde: Balkanlar (1991-1993)*, Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1994, pp. 51-52.

der the presidency of French jurist Robert Badinter). However, Germany rejected this proposal, and announced the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on 23 December, 1991.⁶¹ Moreover, although the report pointed out the negative aspects of recognition, other EU members followed ‘the German path’, and recognized former Yugoslav Republics. All the same, from EMU to NATO and EU enlargement, from the G8 plan to the stability pacts, German leaders have demonstrated their belief that ‘German models and concepts for order can contribute to European solutions’. They have also sought a greater role in other international institutions, whether a seat in the UN Security Council, or their man (a German) at the head of the International Monetary Fund. Germans are thinking harder about ways to shape their environment, in order to protect the common interests. Thus ‘international civil-military relations’ are becoming the key to foreign policy, according to the Bosnian trouble-shooter and former minister in Kohl’s government, Christian Schwarz-Schilling.⁶² In sum, Germany has become more assertive, but it has largely done so within the framework of multilateral institutions, the so-called, ‘assertive multilateralism’. As this is the case, many studies come to the conclusion that Germany still fits the ‘civilian power’ model.

⁶¹ Maull, Hanns W., “Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis”, *Survival*, Vol. 37. No. 4., Winter, 1995-96, pp. 100-105.

⁶² Denison, Andrew, “German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations Since Unification”, *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No.1, April, 2001, p. 161.

3. German Security Policy

A more active role of the European powers in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the EU's capacity to act in these fields have made rapid advances in the late 1990s. The United States' growing reluctance to carry the main burden for security provision for its European allies means that Europe can no longer afford not to act as one in its security requirements. The stationing of Allied troops on German soil and, more importantly, the extension of American guarantees to provide a nuclear shield against the Soviet Union's nuclear threat were important, and the Washington Treaty, signed in 1949, had laid down the commitment of the Allied powers to safeguard the security of Western Europe. However, the replacement of the Europe-first foreign policy of the US by an Asia-first policy made the US to demand greater West European involvement in European regional security.

Germany and the Development of European Security Policy

Stanley Hoffmann contends that Germany has not departed from its reliance on multilateralism, but this reliance is now founded on a more assertive Germany, less inhibited by its past and the international environment. This shift had a major impact on the development of EU security structures, in which Germany seeks to play a leading role. There are three main reasons for German policy-makers to consider the development of a European foreign policy to be in the best interests of Germany: first, Germany's support for the European Political Cooperation (EPC) and CFSP process was a means to counteract the deficiencies in German foreign policy. Second, the confrontational aspect of the Cold War during the late 1970s and early 1980s necessitated the development of a distinctive European voice in the international system. Subsequently, the post-Cold War European system has seen 'a collapse of illusions' regarding the future role and interests of the US in European regional security concerns. Finally, Germany has viewed the extension of cooperation in foreign and security policy among EU member states as the furtherance of the integration process. CFSP can be viewed as an area of the European integration process, where Germany continues to

play the role of *Musterknabe* ('the best pupil in the class').⁶³ Whereas the function of NATO with regard to the area of foreign and security policy was limited in the field of diplomacy, EPC provided an invaluable opportunity for the pursuit of Germany's foreign policy objectives. Membership in EPC provided an outlet for German diplomacy through pursuing multilateral foreign policy, in order to prevent any suspicions of a German *Sonderweg* from arising. Germany actively pursued the process of European integration, most notably in the Genscher-Colombo proposals of 12 November 1981, to deepen integration and bring EPC into the EC process, with the aim of developing a common defence. EPC provided West Germany with an important 'alibi function', which served as a 'means of deflecting external pressure, and cover for shifts in national policy'.⁶⁴ NATO could not be used as a forum for expressing Germany's singular foreign policy interests because of the sensitive nature of the Cold War, and the intention not to upset the close transatlantic relationship. On the other hand, Germany scored a number of diplomatic successes through the CSCE and Chancellor Schmidt's successful efforts to include INFs negotiations into the NATO agenda in the late 1970s. Chancellor Kohl pushed for foreign and security policy integration in Maastricht, very much as a way of deepening Germany's commitment to the European integration process. However, German attempts to move forward foreign and security policy integration were not considered to be an open challenge to American involvement in Europe, as the common defense was considered a (very) long-term process.

The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks, agreed by the WEU in June 1992, into the Treaty of Amsterdam, marked an important step forward in European security policy. The formulation of Article J. 7(2) to include 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking' was a bold step which clarified to some extent the relationship between the WEU and the EU, without suggesting a fusion.⁶⁵ However, this has also placed much greater demands and expectations on CFSP. Hence, the Bremen Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers that took place on 10 and 11 May 1999, expressed the willingness of the European nations to strengthen European operational capabili-

⁶³ Miskimmon, Alister J., "Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship", *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No.1, April, 2001, p. 85.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

ties, as had been determined by the Petersberg Tasks. This was based on appropriate decision-making bodies and effective military means within NATO, or national and multinational means outside the NATO framework. The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP presents Germany, France and the UK with major commitments spanning a wide range of military operations. The decisions made at the Cologne Summit in June 1999 and in Helsinki in December 1999 represent positive strides to meet these commitments.⁶⁶ For Germany, in particular, the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks demands a more interventionist German style within the CFSP and means that Germany is no longer able to shirk responsibility in military operations.

Germany has aimed for Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to be partially extended to questions concerning the CFSP. Opportunities for the use of QMV procedures were stated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, in an attempt to facilitate CFSP decisions and to create the option of ‘coalitions of the willing’, conducting missions under EU auspices, and leaving room for ‘constructive abstention’. Germany also pressed for the appointment of a High Representative for CFSP in Amsterdam, to give the EU a more visible face and point of contact in world affairs. It is argued that ‘the internalization of a European dimension of foreign policy is the most advanced and explicit in Germany, where it forms part of the overall strategy of reflexive multilateralism’.⁶⁷

Current Issues Facing German Policy-makers in CFSP

The Kosovo conflict in 1999 provided an important impetus for greater European cooperation in CFSP. This commitment was emphasised by Chancellor Schröder during the conflict, in order to secure public support for German involvement in the bombing of Serbia: ‘The integration of Germany into the Western community of states is part of the *German Staatsraison*. We do not want a *German Sonderweg*.’ However, the new German government’s stance has changed subtly. According to Schröder ‘the new Ger-

⁶⁶ Bağcı, Hüseyin, “Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler”, in Bal, İdris, ed., *21. Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul: Alfa Basım, 2001, s. 602.

⁶⁷ Miskimmon, Alister J., “Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship”, *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No.1, April, 2001, p. 87.

man foreign policy will not be unhistorical. But I believe we have shown in the past 50 years that there is no reason to tie down the Germans, out of fear of the *furum teutonicus*... My generation and those following are Europeans because we want to be not because we must be. That makes us freer in dealing with others.’⁶⁸

The development of the CESDP since the Cologne European Council Summit in June 1999 leaves German policy-makers with two important choices: the first relates to the direction in which Germany wants the EU’s foreign policy to develop, and the extent of the constraints on this policy. Second, Germany must decide what the EU’s future role should be. Germany has been described as a *zivilmacht*, relying on military means only as a last resort. Germany appears reluctant to commit to further military involvement in multilateral task forces, while, at the same time, remaining very aware of its responsibilities as a NATO and EU member. The uneasiness that remains within Germany concerning the deployment of the Bundeswehr for anything other than peace-keeping operations may result in Germany’s efforts to convince its main EU partners of the merits of a minimalist foreign and security policy in terms of the use of military force. Foreign Minister Fischer has been vocal in expressing his continuing view of EU as a *zivilmacht*. For Fischer the development of a European security and defence capability is not about the militarization of the EU, rather the EU must be made an effective and decisive peaceful power which is able, as was the case in Kosovo, to bolster the rule of law and renounce violence, and thereby to consign war as a political tool in Europe. Within the same context Angelika Beer, the defence spokesperson for Alliance 90/Greens, claimed that the civilian power character of EU should not be lost.⁶⁹

In formulating the security policy, the German foreign and security policy-makers face a dilemma: while Germany is committed to the development of the CESDP and to react to American calls to take more responsibility in its own ‘backyard’, the transatlantic link will continue to exert an important gravitational pull. However, a reluctance to develop the CESDP to a further level may lead to frustrations on the part of France and Britain, which feel more comfortable in resorting to armed force. Another problematic issue has been the US missile shield: Europeans have been very critical of plans

⁶⁸ Miskimmon, Alister J., “Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security Policy and Transatlantic Relationship”, *German Politics*, Vol.10. No. 1, April, 2001, p. 92.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

for a US missile shield. This issue is relevant for Germany and its security needs because of the non-nuclear character of German defence. 'Germany's reliance on the US for a nuclear shield', according to Fischer, 'was always based on our trust that the US would protect our interests, and the US as the leading nuclear power, would guarantee some sort of order'.⁷⁰

Bundeswehr Reform

The importance of the international expectations from Germany and the issue of *Bundeswehr* reform are also problematic for German administrations. Following the declaration of NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative and the EU's Headline Goal, the former German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping invited the US Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, to speak to a *Bundeswehr* audience in Hamburg on the need for German military modernization. Scharping secured the Schröder government's tentative approval for embarking on such a reform, winning initial support from the Federal Cabinet for his 'Cornerstones of Fundamental Renewal' on 14 June, 2000.⁷¹ However, due to the high priority given to reducing public spending in Germany, likely, means that little funding will be forthcoming for such a project. The Ministry of Defence proposes big changes in Germany's armed forces: to cut total *Bundeswehr* strength by a third to 255.000; to increase rapid reaction forces by two-thirds to 150.000; to make serving as a 'citizen in uniform' a profession fit for a high-tech economy, with commensurate compensation and training; to open 'all careers' to women; to streamline procurement and services by adopting modern business practices and by drawing industry into a 'strategic partnership' with the *Bundeswehr*; and, above all, to give Germany the military capabilities it needs to promote 'inclusive security' for itself, its allies and for the other regions.⁷²

The objectives of the *Bundeswehr* reform are thus clear. The question, unresolved yet, is how to finance this reform project. Without Germany, the EU's largest and richest country, Europe's headline-grabbing goals will amount to little. The solution of the problem is due to the solution of inter-

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 94.

⁷¹ Denison, Andrew, "German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations Since Unification", *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No.1, April, 2001, p. 164.

⁷² Ibid., p. 164.

nal discussions in Germany on budgetary problems (economic difficulties in Germany), and the German citizens' perceptions of Germany's new responsibilities and roles.

4. *Germany and the Use of Military Force*

Where the Nazis were declaring ‘total war’ to the world, West German Genscherists were declaring total peace at the time of reunification. While Germans were still almost totally absent from the scene of military action during the Gulf War of 1991, they found themselves centre-stage only eight years later in NATO’s war in Kosovo. There are three perspectives on German participation in military interventions:

The first one is the ‘culture of restraint’ view. According to this view, a stable anti-militarist political culture has evolved in Germany (culture of restraint) after Germany’s loss of the World War II and the breakdown of the Third Reich (which had enormous impact on Germany).⁷³ Public attitudes and the political discourse in Germany on participation in military interventions reflect Germany’s political culture and shape the room for manoeuvre for political decision-makers. It is argued that with regard to the role of a civilian power, there is comparatively little change to be identified for the last decade, as well as expected for the future. While Germany may be pressed by its partners to give up its exceptionalism on the use of force, Germany’s domestic social structures slow down, or even prevent substantial changes in the German position. Thus the undeniable change of German policy from remaining absent in the Gulf War to fully participating in the Kosovo War, is to be seen as a reluctant adaptation to a changing international environment.

The second view is ‘the salami tactics’, or the socializing effects of political action. According to this view, Germany’s policy with regard to the use of military force has changed as a central element of a remilitarization of German foreign policy. They reflect the evolving German readiness to participate in military interventions as the result of a deliberate strategy of German decision-makers who wanted the use of force to become an accepted means of German foreign policy. German decision-makers expanded the scope of Germany’s contributions to out-of-area operations step by step,

⁷³ Baumann, Rainer and Hellmann, Gunther, “Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total War’, the ‘Culture of Restraint’ and the Quest for Normality”, *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No. 1, April, 2001, pp. 62-63.

utilising what can be called ‘salami tactics’.⁷⁴ So the pressure of Germany’s western partners is to be seen less as the causes of German policy changes, but more as welcome opportunities for the proponents of re-militarization to legitimize their course.

The third view is the gradual change and the quest for normality view. They argue that structural as well as action-centered factors shape each other. This is to say, Germany is in the process of ‘coming of age’, becoming more ‘self-confident’ and assertive, feeling less inhibited by her pre-World War II legacy. In the eyes of the abnormalization critics, in contrast, Germany is again ‘militarizing’ its foreign policy, thereby returning to the dubious past of ‘power politics’ (*Machtpolitik*) and ‘a security policy of re-confrontation’.⁷⁵

The above-mentioned theoretical views posit different approaches on the use of force (by Germany), and aim to question whether the German military participation in international forums is a process of remilitarization, or the way it is used fits the civilian power role. The following part analyzes Germany’s participation in military operations with concrete examples.

The German Position before Reunification

The defining concepts in Germany’s foreign policy vocabulary before the reunification were multilateralism (‘never again go it alone’); European integration, with an emphasis on regaining recognition, trust and economic wealth; and anti-militarism with regard to a culture of restraint and civilian power role. Use of force, even in concert with the allies, was not perceived to be an acceptable instrument of foreign policy for Germany. The problem of out-of-area operations was discussed in NATO, and the question of deploying troops attracted only limited attention in West Germany. In 1982 the West German government’s Security Council (*Bundessicherheitsrat*) stressed that the Basic Law (of Germany) prohibited any deployments of *Bundeswehr* troops out-of-area.⁷⁶ In 1987 some politicians began to question

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 63-64.

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 64-66.

⁷⁶ Kreile, Michael, “Will Germany Assume a Leadership Role in the European Union?”, in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, p. 128.

the issue. US forces engaged in a number of skirmishes with Iran, in order to secure the passage of Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. In July 1987 the US called upon its European allies to provide military assistance in this conflict. The US administration asked the German government to send ships to the Persian Gulf. In turn, Germans pointed to their constitutional restrictions, and limited their support to sending a few ships to the Mediterranean. However, the German Ministry of Defence took a position that deviated from the decision of 1982. It maintained that it was constitutional to deploy Bundeswehr forces to protect German merchant ships in the high seas.⁷⁷

Germany in the Gulf War

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War of 1991 became a challenge to the German insistence on military restraint. During that time the political rhetoric was filled with 'Genscherist' terminology: on the one hand, multilateralism and European integration continued to be the guiding concepts. On the other hand, the reunified Germany carried significantly more European and global responsibility and the conduct of 'a policy of the good example', or 'a policy of responsibility' was imperative under the new conditions. In August 1990 the US administration had asked the Kohl government whether Germany could send troops to the Gulf. However, without domestic support, and at a time when the 'Two-plus-Four Treaty' (requiring the Soviet approval) had not yet been ratified, it would be unwise to make such a departure. Also, the German constitution would not allow for a deployment of Bundeswehr soldiers. The only this time was that Christian Democrats portrayed constitutional limit as an obstacle to be overcome, rather than a fundamental constraint to be dealt with. As a reaction to this 'Germany must not lag behind anybody in its efforts for peace', Brandt said, because war, in his view, was 'the ultima irratio of politics'.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, Germany supported its allies with substantial financial contributions amounting to DM 18 billion. Also, with NATO's Defense Planning Committee decision in Janu-

⁷⁷ Baumann, Rainer and Hellmann, Gunther, "Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality", *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No.1, April, 2001, p. 69.

⁷⁸ Joffe, Josef, "Once More: the German Question", *Survival*, Vol.32. No.2, March/April 1990, p. 136.

ary 1991, Allied Mobile Force's air component were sent to bases in south-eastern Turkey, with 200 *Bundeswehr* soldiers and 18 German fighter jets. Thus Genscher's hopes for 'a new culture of international co-existence', with Germany as 'a policy of the good example' was likely to be realized.⁷⁹

*German Military Deployments
in the Early 1990s and the Out-of-Area Debate*

In the early years of reunified Germany, representatives of the Kohl administration argued that Germany was expected, by its partners, to take over more responsibility by contributing to international military operations. In the following period there became a clear rise in the scope of the German contributions to these operations: from medical troops to the UN peace-keeping operation, UNAMIC in Cambodia (in 1991/92), and to the naval forces of the WEU's Operation Sharp Guard monitoring the embargo against Yugoslavia in the Adriatic (from 1992 to 1996), as well as to the dispatch of supply and transport units of the *Bundeswehr* to Somalia (in 1993/94) as part of UNOSOM II.⁸⁰

Although not covered by the Basic Law, and at a time when the debate on the issue of out-of-area operations had not been resolved, the former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel approved the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) deployment in the Mediterranean, after the NATO decision of monitoring the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina on 12 April, 1993. In the course of the next year NATO deployed its AWACS to the Mediterranean. In February 1994 NATO fighter jets shot down four Serbian fighters after repeated Serbian intrusions into the no-fly zone, and in April 1994 NATO planes even attacked Serbian ground forces in order to stop the onslaught on the UN-protected area of Goradze. While Germany did not take

⁷⁹ Haftendorn, Helga, "Gulliver in the Centre of Europe: International Involvement and National Capabilities for Action", in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, pp. 112-115.

⁸⁰ Baumann, Rainer and Hellmann, Gunther, "Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality", *German Politics*, Vol.10. No.1, April, 2001, p. 72.

part in NATO's airstrikes, German air force personnel participated in the surveillance and monitoring operations of AWACS.⁸¹

Actually, the out-of-area debate should not, solely, be evaluated on legal terms: the heart of the problem was never juridical, but historical and political. Historically it should not come as a surprise that a nation which failed disastrously in two world wars, and thereafter succeeded brilliantly in peace, should remain chained to the habits of a 'civilian power'. Although Article 24 of the Basic Law explicitly authorized participation in systems of collective security (let the FRG to become NATO and WEU member), and by becoming a UN member in 1973 the FRG had accepted all obligations under the charter, the German administrations regarded the out-of-area ban as 'holy constitutional writ'. This was the outcome of a historical burden. However, with the end of the Cold War and changing international environment, the new responsibilities and roles of Germany in the international community, begun to be discussed. The political actors in Germany could not solve the problem, and left the solution of the out-of-area question to the Federal Constitutional Court. On 12 July 1994 the Court decided the issue in the affirmative: the *Bundeswehr* may take part in an out-of-area operation if the *Bundestag* gives its authorization, and if this operation is conducted within the framework of a system of collective security. Also, the Constitutional Court supported the contention that NATO could/can be seen as a system of collective security.⁸²

The Constitutional Court's decision was not only the solution of juridical question. It signalled and defined the new role of the reunified Germany in international politics. 30 June 1995 became a watershed date in post-Cold War Germany when the Germans broke through the 40 years old cocoon and the *Bundestag* authorized the government to project force out-of-area into the former Yugoslavia.⁸³

⁸¹ Meiers, Franz-Josef, "Germany: the Reluctant Power", *Survival*, Vol. 37. No. 3, Autumn, 1995, pp. 83-92.

⁸² Joffe, Josef, "No Threats, No Temptations: German Grand Strategy After the Cold War", in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, p. 261.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

German Troops in the Balkans: Participation in IFOR and SFOR

In the light of Srebrenica, the German political elite accepted that the legacy of German history should not only be to call for 'No more Wars!' (*Nie wieder Krieg!*) but also for 'No more Auschwitz!'. NATO's request in February 1995 for sending a large NATO force to the Balkans to secure the retreat of the unsuccessful UNPROFOR, made the former argument more visible. The operation was not materialized, but Bonn responded positively to NATO's request and declared its readiness to contribute a contingent of 1,800 soldiers. In December 1995, the Balkans Contact Group managed to broker the Dayton Peace Accord. The German government had already indicated in October that it would contribute several *Bundeswehr* soldiers, mainly from logistics and transport units to the NATO-led force to police the agreement. When the Dayton Accord was signed, the Bundestag authorized German participation in IFOR, by which, the 3.000 German troops mainly provided medical and logistical assistance to French soldiers. SFOR took over the functions of IFOR in 1996 and Germany's SFOR contingent included combat forces and the *Bundeswehr* troops were regularly stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸⁴

German Participation in Kosovo War

Schröder and Fischer, who were in Washington in 1998 as members of a government-elect, were urged by the White House not to veto any NATO action. After turning back to Bonn, they were confronted with a revised White House request which asked them to raise the pressure on Milosevic by having the Germans to commit to full *Bundeswehr* participation in the operation, at least in NATO staffs, in NATO's AWACS and in other indirect forms of combat. With the deployment of the OSCE observers in Kosovo the coalition was given a limited time. In March 1999 Schröder, Fischer and Scharping had to rise to the challenge of keeping the German people behind the participation in NATO's air war. They succeeded winning praise in both internal and external domains. On 24 March 1999 four German ECR-

⁸⁴ Meiers, Franz-Josef, "Germany: the Reluctant Power", *Survival*, Vol. 37. No.3, Autumn, 1995, p. 91.

Tornados took off from their base in Piacenza to participate in NATO's operation of bombing targets in the former Yugoslav Federation.⁸⁵ For the first time since 1945 German forces took part in offensive combat mission against a sovereign state. The most striking part was that it took place under a Red-Green coalition (who were anti-militarists) and without a UN mandate. German participation in Operation Deliberate Force raised a number of questions about this large and influential country's future role in Europe, its self-perception as a civilian power, and, in addition, the Kosovo tragedy erupted midway through the German presidency of the EU and the WEU, and its chairmanship of the G8.

During a prominent transatlantic conference in Munich, in February 1999, Schröder himself was at pains to emphasise in all clarity that Germany would 'remain a reliable partner'. Moreover, in contrast to past attitudes, according to which Germany's historical legacy prohibited any deployment of German troops out-of-area, the Chancellor emphasized that Germany's historical responsibility made it imperative 'to prevent mass-murder with all the necessary means'. In his view, Germany had come of age as a full member of NATO, now being ready 'without any reservations' to assume responsibility as a normal ally.⁸⁶ Also, after the war started on March 24, the key figures of the German government were constantly referring to unacceptable Serbian terror against the Albanian people, describing the overarching goal of the use of military means to halt continuing serious and systematic violations of human rights, as well as to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. The leading Green 'Realo', Fischer, played a pivotal role in changing attitudes on the German Left, declaring in 1995, after a visit to Bosnia, that military force was morally justified in order to stop genocide, and that German troops should participate in such a humanitarian intervention.⁸⁷

German motivations for participating in the bombing campaign were threefold: first, a strong sense of responsibility towards its NATO allies was a key motive. In the case of Kosovo, not to have participated in the NATO operation would have fatally undermined the international position of the

⁸⁵ Hyde-Price, Adrian, "Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?", *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No. 1, April, 2001, p. 19.

⁸⁶ Baumann, Rainer and Hellmann, Gunther, "Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality", *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No. 1, April, 2001, p. 76.

⁸⁷ Hyde-Price, Adrian, "Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power?", *German Politics*, Vol. 10. No. 1, April, 2001, p. 21.

new German government. Second, a strong sense of moral and political responsibility towards the humanitarian suffering in Kosovo was important. The construction of post-war German identity around a rejection of its totalitarian past (against the legacy of Hitlerism and Holocaust) motivated the German policy-makers in the decision to participate in military intervention. A third important factor was a worry about a new wave of asylum-seekers and refugees. Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo threatened to precipitate large-scale migration into Western Europe, which the German government wished to prevent.

Given its presidency of the EU, Germany played a pivotal role in negotiations to end the war and to bring peace to the region. In early April Foreign Minister Fischer announced a peace plan. The German EU presidency also took the initiative in developing a 'Stability Pact for Southeast Europe', along with more focused economic and financial aid for Albania and Macedonia. Throughout the bombing campaign a key concern of German diplomacy was to involve both the UN and the Russians in the efforts to end the war. In his capacity as the President of the European Council, Chancellor Schröder invited the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to attend the informal EU Summit in Brussels on 14 April. The future role of the EU in a peace settlement for the Balkans was also discussed during Annan's three-day visit to Germany. The Germans did not want the Kosovo War to undermine a cooperative security relationship with Moscow, and so they tried to 'bring the Russians back in the boat'. In April and May many German diplomats and political leaders travelled to Moscow to encourage the Russian administration to play a positive role in the conflict. The German government also encouraged the Americans to intensify their dialogue with Moscow. Finally, the G8 was used as a forum for building a political agreement with Russia. The success of this strategy was evident from the positive outcome of the G8 Summit in Bonn on 5 May, at which a set of 'principles' to end the conflict were agreed on.⁸⁸

The Kosovo tragedy has forced Germany to confront two distinct, but closely inter-linked questions: the first concerns the role and utility of military force. The second is whether European order can continue to rest on the traditional principles of the Westphalian states system, namely sovereignty and non-intervention into states' domestic affairs. With regard to the

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

Germany's role in the Kosovo War, the question whether Germany has remained a 'civilian power' or pursued a 'go it alone policy' is still being discussed. In his speech to the opening session in the *Reichstag* building in Berlin on 19 April, 1999, Chancellor Schröder quoted the Albanian writer Ismail Kandıare: 'With its intervention in the Balkans, Atlantic Europe has opened a new page in world history. It is not about material interests, but about principles: the defence of legality and of the poorest people on the continent. This is a founding act.'⁸⁹ The concept of 'civilian power' is somewhat vague and loosely defined. However, it is not equated with a pacifist renunciation of the use of military force under any circumstances. From this point of view, many International Relations academicians argue that Germany remains a 'civilian power' because of the German attempts to stop human suffering, building and running refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania, its efforts to reach a negotiated settlement and the use of force as a last resort, within a multilateral framework (NATO alliance).

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

Conclusion

The World War II and the defeat of the country totally shifted Germany's foreign and security posture. The new foreign and security logic was built on cooperation instead of competition, on the pursuit of wealth rather than power, on a quest for integration through transfer of sovereignty instead of a vain search for autonomy. Germany rested on the foundations of a democratic polity and projected the rules of this system onto relations among states in Europe, in the Atlantic alliance and internationally. In the process of the evolution of West German foreign policy, the most important point was the rejection of past German *Sonderweg* (its anti-Western orientation, its tendency towards totalitarianism and its military inclinations) and a shift towards a pro-Western and pro-democratic orientation. Thus pacifism, democracy and respect for human rights emerged as powerful core political values in West Germany's foreign-policy role concept. The pacifist impulse implied a strong preference for political solutions, and a profound scepticism vis-à-vis the use of force.⁹⁰ While this attitude reflected Germany's past, it also pointed out the peculiar security position of West Germany during the Cold War because any major war between the two blocs was to devastate (the whole) Germany, whatever the eventual outcome of that war would be.

With the reunification of Germany and the end of the East-West confrontation, in theory, Germany was free to return to the role of one of Europe's Great Powers. However, the reunited country showed no desire to depart (fundamentally) from its post-war foreign policy orientation. It strongly insisted on continuity in its integration policy into the Western alliance system and stuck to the civilian power role concept.

In his book *Risiko Deutschland*, published in 1995, Joschka Fischer argued that it was certainly not in Germany's national interest to give up the dominant civilian power character of its politics and adopt a more assertive foreign policy.⁹¹ Later, however, Joschka Fischer was the Foreign Minister in a

⁹⁰ Maull, Hanns W., "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?", *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 2, Summer, 2000, pp. 65-66.

⁹¹ Fischer, Joschka, *Risiko Deutschland: Krise und Zukunft der Deutschen Politik*, Köln: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1995, pp. 228-229 [from abstract of the book, in English version, in <http://www.internationalaffairs.com>]

coalition government that has deployed German military forces in combat missions abroad (as in Kosovo without UN Mandate).

The evolution of German foreign policy in the 1990s, and its policy in this period can be identified as one of 'modified continuity'. The starting point of the continuity thesis is the empirical finding that the post-reunification German governments' foreign policy rhetoric continued to stress the central themes of the civilian power ideal-type. It is underlined that reunified Germany stuck to its treasured 'policy of active integration and broad international cooperation'. Germany's willingness to further integrate into the EU and NATO, its aim to seize autonomy through the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the limitation on the troop strength of the German Armed Forces, reflect the reunified Germany's motives and objectives.

The civilian power concept, to which West German foreign policy was settled after the World War II, implied a foreign policy identity which promoted multilateralism, institution-building and supranational integration, and tried to constrain the use of force in international relations through national and international norms. This foreign policy orientation was shaped by Germany's traumatic past. This is to say, the lessons derived from history led to aversion against the use of military power and Germany never again wants to threaten stability in Europe and the international system. With the collapse of the USSR, the threat emanating from the Communist Bloc has disappeared, but ethno-nationalist conflicts have erupted on Europe's periphery. Inevitably, Germany has shifted to a new security posture to overcome the new threats. However, this new security posture does not constitute a fundamental departure from Germany's post-war foreign policy identity as a civilian power and manages to reconcile most core values of Germany's post-war foreign policy role.

Germany's changing position on out-of-area missions of the *Bundeswehr* can be grounded on two main reasons: the first, the change in attitudes towards the utility and legitimacy of military action is due to pressure from Germany's partners, to make Germany take more responsibilities in the international forums. Second, the change is conceptualized as a product of societal socialization. Facing the dilemma that non-military means had not been sufficient to deter Serb forces from slaughtering civilians in the UN-protected areas, Fischer argued that Germany's traditional pacifism could not mean that Germans would stand by idly when genocide happened. In his speech to the Bundestag, in late 1995, he argued:

We are in a real conflict between basic values. On the one hand, there is the renunciation of force as a vision of a world in which conflicts are resolved rationally, through recourse to laws and majority decisions, through the constitutional process and no longer through brute force; a world in which military means are rejected, and in which the aim is to create structures to replace them and make them redundant. On the other hand, there is the bloody dilemma that human beings may be able to survive only with the use of military force. Between solidarity for survival and our commitment to non-violence – that is our dilemma.⁹²

Following the end of the Cold War, discussions on the future role of NATO and EU started. The idea to turn these two organizations from ‘communities of prosperity’ into ‘communities of values’ gained weight. In addition to this, with the Helsinki process beginning in 1975, the concepts of democracy and human rights and respect for these values have become important issues in the conduct of inter-state relations. Germany’s sensitivity for the non-violation of human rights is a key fact, laden with its traumatic history. Thus Germany’s involvement in use of force (with the precondition of multilateral involvement) to prevent human suffering and to prevent ‘genocide’ is no surprise. In other words, Germany’s involvement in use of force to keep these values is to be regarded as a process of adapting to the international community and acting within the context of the ‘policy of responsibility’.

Germany is a member of NATO, EU and the OSCE. To keep cooperative relations with Washington, Paris and Moscow is the primary objective for German foreign policy-makers. However, it is obvious that these options do not add up to a coherent whole and to harmonize political objectives of these organizations is not an easy task: the French connection does not fit with the Atlantic one and the Central European option clashes with the Russian relationship, as well as with the necessity of keeping the EU homogeneous for the purpose of deepening. However, Germany has pursued a policy of diversification, balance and compensation. Thus German grand strategy will maximize options and minimize hard and fast commitments. It will want to retain a paid-up insurance policy underwritten by the US. It will try to keep its special friendship with France, without forsaking Britain. Germany

⁹² Maull, Hanns W., “Germany and the Use of Force: Still a ‘Civilian Power?’”, *Survival*, Vol.

will seek to bring East and Central European countries into NATO and EU. However, it will pursue a 'Greater Central European Sphere' with prudence, taking care not to alienate Russia or to arise Western suspicions.⁹³

Within the context of the aim of this study, with regard to the questions asked at the beginning, and through the foreign and security policy record of Germany since reunification, although the 'German Question' has not been totally resolved, it is likely to be less traumatic. It is no surprise that German foreign and security policies have evolved parallel to the international developments and have adapted to the international structure and 'atmosphere' within which these policies are formulated. However, this is not a radical shift from the parameters and orientation of the West German foreign and security policies, settled during the Cold War. Thus it can be argued that continuity dominates over change in German foreign policy during the 1990s. Germany has stuck to its role of a 'civilian power'. Although it has become more assertive, it has stayed bound to its multilateral commitments. Germany's primary goal is to keep its status as an equal and respected member of the international community and this depends on the successful, peaceful and democratic closure of the 'German Question', which has been underway during the 1990s.

42, No. 2, Summer, 2000, p. 63.

⁹³ Joffe, Josef, "No Threats, No Temptations: German Grand Strategy After the Cold War", in Heurlin, Bertel, ed., *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, London: Macmillan Press LTD, 1996, pp. 270-271.

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